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The Politics of Belonging: Complexities of Identity in the
Catalan Borderlands
Jouni Häkli
Abstract: The rise of the European nation-state system profoundly influenced the map of linguistic and cultural
minorities. Catalonia in north-eastern Spain is no exception. The consolidation of the Spanish and French kingdoms
during the 16th and 17th centuries left Catalan speakers without political and cultural sovereignty. Furthermore, in
the Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659 the Catalan homeland els Països Catalans was divided by the Franco-Spanish
border.
Today, Catalan culture and politics enjoy increasing latitude in both Spain and France. This has encouraged
various forms of cross-border co-operation in the Catalan borderlands. It also has led many Catalan nationalists to
expect still greater political autonomy. Some activists have voiced claims for independence and even the re-
incorporation of the Spanish (el Principat)  and  French  Catalonias  (Catalunya Nord). However, political tensions
regarding the borderland's development exist between the local actors and the Spanish and the French national
governments, as well as between Catalan nationalists and the population at large.
This article examines these tensions first by looking at cross-border co-operation efforts in Catalonia, and
second by assessing the visible markers of identity that Catalan nationalists have placed in the border landscapes.
These are contrasted with the results of a survey charting the opinions and attitudes of "ordinary" Catalans. The
article argues that there are significant cleavages among Catalans, and that the era of the nation-states has left a
legacy of complex loyalties at international frontiers.
INTRODUCTION
Much of the 20th century could well be regarded as the age of the nation-state (Spruyt,
1994; Hirst, 1997). The first two decades of the century saw several new states
emerging  in  the  aftermath  of  the  First  World  War.  These  “successor  states”  were  the
realisation of the new ruling idea of international law: the principle of national self-
determination (Herb, 1997). The Second World War witnessed outbursts of nationalism
on an unprecedented scale, and ended up reinforcing the existing divisions in Europe
and around the globe. However, the devastation caused by two major wars also
underlined the necessity for systems that help restrain and alleviate tensions between
nation-states. European integration, in its various forms, can partly be understood as a
contribution to these efforts with the ultimate goal of sustaining peace in Europe
(Heffernan, 1998). Progressing integration, with the European Union as its apex, has
also fostered an increasing number of economic, political and cultural relations and
activities directed across existing state boundaries (Häkli, 1998c; Scott, 2000).
In consequence, many previously hostile or socially ‘frozen’ borderlands between
European nation-states have turned into lively playgrounds for various local, regional,
national, and international actors, representing a variety of interests (Donnan and
Wilson, 1999; Perkman, 1999). This has led some commentators to argue for the
gradual erosion, or even disappearance, of the state boundaries erected since the peace
of Westphalia in the 17th century (e.g. Ohmae, 1991; Pettman, 1996; Appadurai, 1996).
Moreover, the “borderless world” discourse has gained strength from the growing
orthodoxy concerning the contemporary world economy (Hirst, 1997; Newman &
Paasi, 1998). Borders seem to mean less and less in an informational economy and
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society, where knowledge, information and capital move around the globe with
astounding ease and speed.
However, while in Europe and elsewhere some borderlands certainly are approaching
the condition of being borderless, in other regions the development may not proceed
with equal speed, or it may even take the reverse direction, as in the newly established
states of the former Eastern Europe and the Baltics (Graham, 1998). Hence, to avoid
unwarranted generalisation regarding the development of the European borderlands, it is
crucial to take the borderland context into account (Häkli and Kaplan, 2002). In
practice, this means paying attention to the historical development of the politics and
culture of the borderland, as well as the contemporary social and economic conditions
under which various forms of cross-border co-operation take place. The latter may
include different perspectives on the border and its meanings: those who are
institutionally involved in official cross-border co-operation tend to view the borderland
differently from those who are committed to nationalist goals. The rather extreme views
of the latter, again, may differ considerably from those of the “ordinary” borderland
denizens, for whom the borderland merely represents an everyday environment marked
by certain physical and social characteristics.
The relevance of actors’ perspectives in understanding the evolving European
borderlands  is  well  illustrated  by  the  case  of  Catalonia.  This  article  first  looks  at  the
position of Catalonia as a borderland, and at  the forms of cross-border co-operation in
the region. The official cross-border relations are then contrasted with the discourse of
Catalan nationalists, especially by assessing the visible markers of identity that Catalan
activists have placed in the border landscapes. The tensions existing within civil society
are then examined by comparing the nationalist symbolisms with the results of a survey
charting the opinions and attitudes of "ordinary" Catalans. The article argues that there
are significant cleavages among Catalans, and that Manuel Castells’ thinking on the
social bases of identity in the contemporary world may be useful in attempts to
understand this variety. In conclusion it is acknowledged that the era of the nation-states
has left a legacy of complex loyalties at international frontiers, and that people’s sense
of place is a social power that should not be underestimated in the analysis of European
integration.
CATALANS: A BORDERLAND PEOPLE
The Catalan borderland between Spain and France is an apt example of the significance
of context in the development of borderland relations. In regard of distinctive language
and culture Catalonia could well be an independent nation (e.g. Pi-Sunyer, 1980;
Graham, 1998). However, the heyday of Catalan political independence lies far back in
history, the age of prosperity under the kingdom of Aragon in the 16th century. Since
then, Catalonia has been subjected to the currents of geopolitical rivalry between the
Spanish and French ruling dynasties, and later, state governments (Sahlins, 1989;
Brunn, 1992). For example, the treaty of the Pyrenees that ended the Thirty Year’s War
between Spain and France in 1659 meant the division of the traditional Catalan
homeland, els Països Catalans. The major part of Catalonia remained within Spain but
the northern part, Catalunya nord, was annexed to France  (García-Ramon and Nogué-
Font, 1994).
While the two states basically reached an agreement on the limits of their sovereignty
when signing the Treaty of the Pyrenees, two centuries passed before the border actually
materialised in the form of border stones. The delimitation of the border was reached in
the Treaties of Bayonne (1856/1866) and only after that was the border strictly
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controlled. Nevertheless, as Peter Sahlins (1998) aptly shows, many village
communities in the Pyrenees insisted on their separate national identities and territories
well  before  the  boundary  was  defined.  Hence,  the  sense  of  separate  nationality  was
premised more on the emerging ideal of territorial sovereignty, and its local experience,
than the national boundary itself. In fact, instead of merely separating people, the
delimitation of the boundary paved the way for border crossings and co-operation
between the Spanish and French Catalonias.
This is still the state of affairs in the Catalan borderlands today. Both Spain and
France  have  a  Catalan  speaking  minority,  even  though  the  political  and  economic
position of the Spanish Catalonia, el Principat, far exceeds that of its northern
counterpart (Mansvelt-Beck, 1993). In fact, the strength of the Comunitat Autònoma de
Catalunya (Autonomous Community of Catalonia) among the Spanish regions does not
really merit the label of minority for Catalans. In France, the state has pursued centralist
policies much more successfully, and consequently the Catalan language and culture
have had to make significant concessions to the standard French language, manners and
systems of education (Mancebo, 1999).
Given  the  legacy  of  division  of  the  Catalan  territory,  the  deep  roots  of  Catalan
culture, and the region's current economic prosperity and political autonomy, one could
estimate that cross-border co-operation will soon erase the boundary between Spain and
France, or Catalunya and Catalunya nord. Adding to such expectations, both Spain and
France are Schengen countries that no longer make border checks on people and goods
coming from other member countries. Moreover, the European Union has for long
encouraged and financed cross-border co-operation in various forms (e.g. the Interreg,
Phare  and  Tacis  programmes).  Finally,  Catalonia  is  one  of  the  more  active  European
regions with a marked interest in forging relations of co-operation with partners in other
European countries (Guibernau, 1997). In consequence, Catalonia is currently part of
such  trans-national  alliances  as  the  "Euroregion  Catalonia,  Midi-Pyrenees,  Languedoc
Roussillon", "the Pyrenees’ working group", "the Four Motors for Europe", "the
Mediterranean arc", and others.
In all, the scene seems to be set for the gradual erosion of the boundary between
Spanish and French Catalonia. Many of those involved in cross-border co-operation
would surely testify to the prospect. Examples of successful projects are many, ranging
from sister cities’ exchange of experience and information to local cross-border co-
operation in areas such as the annual vehicle inspection, water treatment, and the
development of tourism (Roig, 1997). Larger scale projects range from a programme for
exchange and mutual learning under the banner of Occitan culture, to lobbying for a
high velocity train connection running through Barcelona and Toulouse (e.g. Carta
d'acció, 1993). In all of these official cross-border co-operations the boundary is an
irrelevant element that can and should be transcended.
This is also essentially the message of Catalan nationalist organisations, most of
which would agree that Catalonia is "still legally occupied and colonised by the Spanish
and French states" (Consell Nacional Català, 2001). However, while the unity of the els
Països Catalans may be a shared goal, the means of achieving it, as well as the meaning
attached to territorial unity, differ significantly. Whereas the Catalan nationalists are
free to design provocative political programmes and proclamations, actors representing
more official views are necessarily less radical and more inclined towards the
accommodation of various policies and considerations, including those of the national
governments. Therefore, while the latter usually talk about cross-border co-operation, or
at best regionalisation (e.g. Serratosa, 1997; Vallvé, 1997), the nationalists' rhetoric
often centres on no less than an independent Catalan state (e.g. Maulets, 2001).
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WRITING THE NATION IN THE BORDER LANDSCAPE
The political history of Catalonia, and especially the loss of autonomy during the
dictatorship of General Franco 1939-1975, have provided a fertile ground for the
emergence of numerous nationalist groups. Even the largest and most influential party
in Catalonia, the Convergence and Union (CiU), could be labelled nationalist. However,
the CiU is led by the long-standing President of the Generalitat de Catalunya, Jordi
Pujol,  who is known to be a moderate politician acting within the Catalan tradition of
'pactism' (Genieys, 1998). Therefore the term nationalist is here reserved for those
activists who are less inclined to negotiation and formal representative politics.
Before the death of Franco all nationalist groups were forced to operate underground.
This accounts for their manifold and frequently changing names and compositions. Still
today there are numerous organisations with more or less nationalist agendas -- far more
than can be listed here. Among the more prominent and visible organisations are
Consell Nacional Català (CNC), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC),
Plataforma per la Unitat d'Acció (PUA), and Unitat Nacional Catalana (UNC).
Prominent youth organisations include Coordinadora d'Estudiants dels Països Catalans
(CEPC), Maulets, and Joventuts d' Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (JERC).
Most of these organisations seek to make their messages visible in territorial terms.
Geographical research on nationalism has shown that territory is more important an
element in the construction of national identities than studies have generally
acknowledged (e.g. Nogué, 1991; Paasi, 1996; Hooson, 1994; Herb and Kaplan, 1999).
Joan Nogué (1998) has distinguished at least seven dimensions through which territory
may acquire significance in the construction of national identities. These include
cartographic representation, education in geography, the definition of national
boundaries, internal regional divisions, ideological landscapes, the idea of national
character, and the protection of nature. I have elsewhere argued for the need to take both
the textual and physical landscapes into account in the analysis of nationalism. The
concept of discursive landscape points at the intersection of narratives describing
national histories, images portraying the homeland of national communities, and the
instalment of national symbolisms in physical space (Häkli, 1999).
The inscription of national symbolism into a landscape is a historically and
geographically multifaceted process. Landscape is a socially constructed way of seeing,
experiencing, and interpreting particular things and events. The relation between
nationalism and cultural landscape can be addressed by focusing on these structured
aspects of landscape, by looking at the ways in which things and events are
systematically drawn to signify nationhood (on representative landscape, see also
Duncan, 1990; Graham, 1998). The fact that there are certain textual or text-like
materials  through which  this  can  be  done  --  the  result  of  reading  and  writing  national
space -- justifies the term discursive in connection with landscape (Häkli, 1999).
However, the perception and interpretation that make up a landscape always take
place in some material and cultural contexts. Therefore a more substantive
understanding of space underlies the concept of discursive landscape. National
landscape is not only read off from nature and culture, it is also written therein. The
discursive landscape evolves dialectically when national symbols, which assume their
meanings in and through the historical narratives of a nation, are concretely inserted into
the very landscapes they describe (Kaplan, 2000).
A discursive landscape is also what the Catalan nationalists are constructing, more or
less intentionally. Els Països Catalans, the Catalan linguistic and cultural area, is a
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spatial concept that simultaneously points to the shared cultural history of Catalan
speakers, and a definite geographical area (consisting of the Autonomous Community
of Catalonia, the northern parts of Valencia, the eastern parts of Aragon, the Balearic
Islands, the Principality of Andorra, the French Roussillon, and the Sardinian town of
Alghero) (Guibernau, 1997). It is the cartographic image of this area that the nationalists
frequently use to make the point of the unity of Catalans (Figure 1). Moreover, both the
concept and the image of els Països Catalans underline the artificiality of the boundary
between Spain and France.
Figure 1. Els Països Catalans as portrayed on a map (Source: the website of 'Maulets' 2001)
The message of unity across Catalan countries is literally written into the border
landscapes of Catalonia. The landscape is physically very distinctive because the border
mainly runs along the highest elevation of the Pyrenees. Moreover, the Catalans
perceive themselves as a mountain people. This underlines the role of the Pyrenees as a
cultural bridge rather than a physical divider between the Spanish and French
Catalonias. The Pyrenees also occupy a central place in Catalan historiography. It was
the mountains and monasteries that protected Catalan culture, first against the intrusions
of Moorish conquest in the Iberian peninsula that lasted until the 14th century, and later,
against political oppression by Madrid seeking to convert Catalans to the dominant
Castilian culture and language (Laitin et al., 1994). Little wonder, then, that the
Pyrenees accommodate many of the landmarks of Catalan identity, such as the
monasteries  of  Ripoll  and  Montserrat,  and  the  mountain  peak  of  Canigou  (Nogué,
1998). Even the traditional Catalan cuisine Mar i Muntanya, which combines game with
seafood, recognises the existence of mountains as a central constituent of the Catalan
identity.
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Hence, the border-crossing points located in the mountain valleys of Cerdanya, Coll
d'Ares, Coll del Portús, and Coll de Belitres make up a perfect location for the insertion
of nationalist symbolism. Slogans like “neither France nor Spain”, “free Catalonia”, or
signposts with Spanish and French names written over and replaced with Catalan names
are typical elements in the Catalan border landscapes (Figures 2 and 3). Not even the
sign of the French region of Languedoc-Roussillon is left untouched, as it is reminiscent
of a provincial division originating in the French state, rather than the Catalan tradition.
For Catalan nationalists the region is Catalunya Nord, or in French, Rossello.
Figure 2. Now defunct border crossing point on the Coll d'Ares (Photo by J. Häkli, 1999)
Certainly, the Catalan border-crossing points do not exhaust the geographical
extension of the Franco-Spanish boundary. But symbolically they are among the most
significant landscapes for Catalan nationalism. Border-crossing points are particular
locations where nationalist discourses seek to erase the legitimacy of the state boundary.
Yet, they are not the only instances for dispute centred on the border between France
and Spain. The efforts by Catalan nationalists to deconstruct the border discursively
may also take place through urban demonstrations, strategically placed banners,
informal meetings, or the Internet, just as easily as they can find expression written
upon the Catalan border landscapes.
The symbolic aspect of boundaries points at their thoroughly social and cultural
nature: boundaries are not mere political lines marked in geographical space. Rather
they are constructs that exist in various social practices – those of individual people as
well as institutions (Sahlins, 1989; Paasi, 1996). Moreover, from the discursive nature
of national boundaries their multivocality follows. Borders acquire different meanings
for people involved in different social functions and practices (Häkli, 2002). Catalan
nationalism is one very noticeable, and visible discourse with obvious implications
regarding the border. However, there are other conceptions of the border in civil society.
It is to these that we shall now turn.
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POPULAR VISIONS OF THE CATALAN BORDERLANDS
Identity was one of the most used and least theorised catchwords of the cultural studies
literature of the 1990’s (Paasi & Häkli, 2001). It is still frequently used in attempts to
understand the multi-layered and sometimes overlapping feelings of community and
belonging in various social and spatial groups. While identity is a useful concept for
discussing spatial group formation, it should be kept in mind that the word in itself
explains little. Rather, the concept of identity can be seen as a constituent part of the
very  discourses  that  form  imagined  communities.  For  example,  the  government  of
Catalonia frequently makes reference to the ‘Catalan identity’ in official texts and
publications, and undoubtedly does so in an attempt to reinforce the sense of
'Catalanness' among the population (Guibernau, 1997).
Figure 3. A  signpost  written  over  at  a  border  crossing  point  of  la  Guingueta  d'Ix  in  Cerdanya  valley
(Photo by J. Häkli, 1999).
Yet, as the nationalist discourse on borderless Catalonia shows, there are alternatives
to such governmental visions. There are also several indications of tensions existing
between these two and the more popular visions of the Catalan borderlands. One
interesting example is the result of an interview questionnaire made in the Catalan
borderlands in 1999. Altogether 360 borderlanders were interviewed, 77 on the French
and 283 on the Spanish side of the border. The interview charted people’s border
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crossing frequency and motives, and their opinions about cross-border co-operation and
relaxed border control in Catalonia. It also elicited the respondents’ future expectations
regarding the disappearance of the border, as well as their understanding of the
borderlands as a cultural and geographical unity.
The questionnaire interview was carried out in counties (comarques) adjacent to the
border, and in all major cities. The results reveal that border crossing is a frequent
activity for most of the people. Roughly one third of the respondents said that they cross
the state border at least once a month, and some 40 per cent at least once a year. The
remaining  one  third  said  that  they  never  cross  the  state  boundary.  The  most  common
motive for border crossing was either leisure or shopping.
Hence, it is not surprising that the Catalan borderlanders generally view the relaxed
border control in positive terms. Roughly two out of three people on both sides of the
border said that the increasing permeability of the state boundary is a favourable
development. The respondents also think positively about co-operation across the
border. Variation in the answers according to proximity to the border was only slight.
However, in Cerdanya valley the share of positive attitudes was lower than anywhere
else. This is likely to reflect the tense relations among the residents of the valley, which
historically has frequently been a zone of conflict between villages and nationalities
(Sahlins, 1989; Mancebo, 1999). Nonetheless, the answers to these two interview
questions seem to support the governmental and nationalist idea of a borderless
Catalonia emerging across the Franco-Spanish boundary.
However, some questions in the interview clearly revealed that the dividing function
of the state border between Spanish and French Catalonias is still very much a reality
for many people. For example, when asked what place names best describe the
borderlands seen from where the interviewee lives, an integrative term was used by only
20 per cent of the interviewees on the Spanish side, and 22 per cent on the French side.
The remaining respondents used a name that continues to recognise the border.
Arguably, the discursive landscape of Els Països Catalans, capable of challenging the
traditional national communities of Spanish and French Catalonia, is not yet in
existence in the Catalan borderlands. It seems that the nationalist ideal of a 'Greater
Catalonia' is not shared by most of the population living in the area.
Another discrepancy in the visions of the Catalan borderland was revealed when
people were asked how much they actually knew about institutional cross-border co-
operation. While more than half of Catalan borderlanders knew that some forms of
cross-border co-operation exist, there were very few who could specify an example.
Moreover,  when  asked  if  they  knew  about  the  practical  functions  of  cross-border  co-
operation, and how to participate, the overwhelming majority answered negatively.
Thus, there seems to be little in the official co-operation that “ordinary” Catalans can
identify with. While border crossing is a commonplace activity for many, as part of
people’s everyday interaction, this can be done without any need to question the
relevance of the border of the traditional identities connected to it.
CONCLUSION: IDENTIFICATIONS NEW AND OLD
Several tensions and cleavages exist in the politics of belonging among the different
groups of Catalan borderlanders. Mostly these arise from different aspirations and
attitudes toward the Catalan borderland and territory connected to the actors’ particular
social practices and projects. While we can certainly understand and respect this variety,
it is more difficult to see how all these different social and cultural dynamics could be
seen as interlinked with, or arising from, the contemporary local and global conditions.
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In this respect Manuel Castells’ (1997) idea of three different types of identification
may be useful in unravelling the complexities of belonging at the Catalan borderlands.
According to Castells (1997, pp. 66) legitimising identities derive mainly from states’
institutional structures. They are the result of the era of the nation-states characterised
by increasing powerful and interventionist state government that provides the
population with citizenship rights, and rationalises its domination by producing and
reproducing national identities. These identifications still seem to hold strong in
contemporary Europe, despite the intensifying integration process. People have not been
willing  to  surrender  their  traditional  loyalties,  at  least  as  long  as  the  state  remains  the
primary provider of their citizenship rights (Dijkink, 1996; Hirst, 1997).
Project identities are typical for actors who are engaged in new kinds of social
networks, activities and projects (Castells, 1997, pp. 8). Those who are actively
participating in future oriented projects tend to identify with the realities they are
constructing. They seek to redefine their position, and ultimately transform society by
constructing new identities. Cross-border co-operation between institutional actors
could well be seen to give rise to project identities. Such co-operation may produce
visions of trans-national regions emerging in the borderlands through institutional
networks (e.g. Scott, 2000). However, to the degree that this vision is shared by a
restricted group only, project identity is also confined to a small circle of active
participants in the projects of co-operation (Häkli, 1998a;b).
When yet another perspective is adopted – one that does not have to share the
optimism of the managers of co-operation, nor the inclination to the status quo of the
“ordinary people” – it is possible to distinguish the third form of identification.
According to Castells (1997, pp. 66) resistance identities are formed in reaction to the
dominant forces that seem to be marginalising actors and eroding significant local
traditions. The fervent enthusiasm of the Catalan nationalists, and the emphasis they
place on the traditional connection between people and homeland, may easily be
interpreted in terms of resistance. Not only are they resisting the oppression by the
Spanish and the French national governments, but also the official discourses of cross-
border co-operation that merely introduce new layers of government into the Catalan
borderlands, instead of striving for a more radical territorial reform.
The complexities of belonging in Catalonia and other European borderlands might
easily be dismissed as a passing phase on our way toward an integrated Europe.
However,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  politics  of  belonging  will  be  over  any  time  soon
(Dijkink, 1996; Wilson and Donnan, 1998, Appadurai, 1996). The ethnic, cultural, and
political map of Europe is so diverse, and crossed by so many boundaries, that while old
borders  are  being  crossed,  new  tensions  are  also  likely  to  arise.  Additional  cleavages
exist between the visions and intentions of the various social actors and groups that are
active participants in the negotiation of the meanings of borderlands.
Social and cultural inertia embedded in people’s connection with territory, the sense
of place, is a much more powerful intervening force than the professionals of integration
in Europe and elsewhere may have expected. As it is unlikely that ‘Europeanness’ will
soon  emerge  as  a  singular  cultural  identity,  it  is  safe  to  argue  that  the  politics  of
belonging will persist in Europe. Instead of merely appreciating the fact, we should seek
to analyse its roots and consequences, balancing carefully between ‘Castellsian’
generalisation and sensitivity to local contextuality.
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